

## ISSUES AND ANSWERS

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and  
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Has President de Gaulle's opposition killed the allied nuclear force?

Will the Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders kiss and make up?

Now for the answers to the issues, from Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze. Here to interview Secretary Nitze are ABC Pentagon Correspondent, Richard Bate, and with the first question, ABC State Department Correspondent, John Scali.

MR. SCALI: Mr. Nitze, welcome to ISSUES AND ANSWERS.

The Russians say they have just completed a successful series of tests of long-range missiles into the Pacific. What do we know about this, were these tests as successful as they claim and do you think perhaps they have closed the missile gap?

MR. NITZE: Well, we have no reason to believe that they were not successful. A series of tests of this kind certainly has -- you succeed on some of your objectives, you don't succeed on all of your objectives. But on the second part of your question which seems to me to be the important part, we do not believe that they have closed the missile gap -- their missile gap -- or do we believe they are about to. We believe that we have -- that we are ahead in this particular field and that we will continue to be ahead.

MR. SCALI: Are we substantially ahead, would you say, sir?

MR. NITZE: I believe we are substantially ahead.

MR. BATE: In what way, numbers, or capability of throwing large weights, or what?

MR. NITZE: Well, in numbers of ICBM's. We are adding a Minuteman or a Polaris missile every day. At, really, the rate which we are adding to our nuclear deterrent force it is really very great indeed and we don't believe they are equalling that rate.

MR. BATE: In other words, we are cranking them out like ice boxes and Khrushchev is not, as he said he would be able to do?

MR. NITZE: We don't crank them out like ice boxes, there is a lot of work that goes into them, but we are producing.

MR. SCALL: Mr. Nitze, do we believe the Soviet explanation of these missile tests were strictly for peaceful purposes, to develop a booster for space exploration, or do we think that perhaps these tests may have had a military purpose, too?

MR. NITZE: A booster can be used for either purpose. A booster puts an object up into the atmosphere, or into outer space, and a powerful booster, or a booster powerful enough to do a space shot, would also be powerful enough to put a warhead up.

MR. BATE: Mr. Nitze, are we liable to be shocked one

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of these days should the Russians make a military use of man in space? Aren't there indications that they might be planning something like this? A man in the sky with a gun in his hand sort of thing?

MR. NITZE: Well, a man in the sky with a gun in his hand, if it is just a gun, I don't think we would be concerned about that. I imagine what you are referring to is the possibility that they might orbit in space a nuclear weapon of some kind.

MR. BATE: Exactly.

MR. NITZE: We think it would be very regretable indeed if space were to be used for such purposes. We think it would be largely a terror use of space. It isn't a medium in which one would, of choice, carry out a military objective. It is very expensive, the weapons would be very inaccurate if launched from space. But it might have a terror effect and we don't propose that space be used in that way and we would hope that the Soviet Union would not so do.

MR. BATE: Well, aren't there indications that the Soviet Union might be planning just such a terror weapon?

MR. NITZE: No. There are indications -- well, I think the facts support a capability on their part to launch very large objects into space and having that capability they could, if they so decided, convert that into a weapon in space, but we have no indication that they have a program to so do.

MR. BATE: Aren't we ourselves beginning to think along the same lines of making at least reconnaissance use of a military man in space?

MR. NITZE: Of a man in space?

MR. BATE: For a military mission. Not necessarily to trigger a bomb or to guide a bomb to a target on the ground but at least in a reconnaissance way.

MR. NITZE: Well, certainly space vehicles are useful. From the standpoint of taking scientific observations. We do have space vehicles now which photograph clouds which help

us with our weather predictions and things of that kind which are peaceful uses of space, which may also have some military importance in the way of information. These, we think, are proper and these we are developing.

MR. SCALL: Mr. Nitze, Secretary of State Rusk said this week that the Soviets may be disinterested in a nuclear test ban because they may be about to launch a new series of nuclear tests in the atmosphere. Do you share this view?

MR. NITZE: It depends upon the time frame. I would be surprised if they are preparing in the near-term future a series of tests in the atmosphere. They have always said that if we continued to test under ground they would at some time test in the atmosphere and in the absence of a test ban treaty we do propose to continue to test under ground.

MR. SCALL: What do you mean by "near-term future", do you rule out perhaps tests at all during this year?

MR. NITZE: I frankly would be surprised if they tested in the atmosphere this year but one can't be certain of that.

MR. SCALL: If and when they are about to launch such a series of tests would our monitoring system or intelligence apparatus in some way have had advance word, do you think?

MR. NITZE: Well, this is a subject I would prefer not to discuss.

MR. SCALL: As you know, Mr. Nitze, the Soviet leadership is planning a series of important meetings in Moscow beginning

next month. I think there is the Central Committee and then the Chinese Communists and Soviet leaders are supposed to try to meet to see whether they can't patch things up. Do you foresee any possibility at this time that the Chinese and the Soviets can settle what appears to be a very sharp dispute on ideology?

MR. NITZE: If I were sitting in the Kremlin I think I would put very high on my agenda the question of my relationships with the Chinese Communists. This is clearly a central issue in the Communist world. The differences between the Chinese Communists and the Soviets have been very deep indeed. They have been not only ideological differences but also differences of interest between the two groups. So I am sure that an attempt will be made to find some bridge between Peking and Moscow, to try to find some way between these deep differences. But whether or not they can be successful in doing that this -- we can't tell whether they can be successful. I would be surprised if they could make a real accommodation between the two points of view. They have been so basically apart in the past that to suddenly work out all these differences of interest, differences in ideological approach, this would surprise me very much indeed.

MR. SCALI: What about the predictions that a new and tougher Soviet line is almost certain to emerge from this series of meetings?

MR. NITZE: Well certainly the Chinese Communist ideological line has been in favor of a tougher attitude toward the West. This isn't to say that the Soviet line isn't tough toward the West but the Chinese Communist line is even tougher in the sense of forceful action, action involving substantial risk.

In an endeavor to accommodate their position to that of the Chinese Communists they might move somewhat in that direction. I think we ought to be fully cognizant of that risk. I don't think that we can look upon the current pause in Soviet foreign policy. They haven't been active in foreign policy in recent months but I should think it was a mistake on our part to draw from that a conclusion that this would continue indefinitely. I think we have to be prepared for a renewal of active tension between the East and the West.

MR. BATE: Do you think that Mr. Khrushchev is under pressure from the military men in the Soviet Union to get tougher, in addition to being under pressure from the Chinese, and do you think that the Russian military hierarchy will begin to have more influence?

MR. NITZE: I don't think that we have any indications that Mr. Khrushchev is not in firm control of the situation in the Soviet Union. The Communist doctrine calls for very firm control by the Communist party over the military element of their society and I don't think we have any indications that that has broken down in any way.



MR. BATE: Do you foresee the possibility that perhaps a member of the Russian military hierarchy might succeed Mr. Khrushchev one of these days?

MR. NITZE: It would surprise me a great deal. It is contrary to their entire view of the Communist organization to have a military man at the head of the organization.

MR. SCALI: Mr. Nitze, there are rumors that after this series of meetings the Soviets may decide to spend quite a bit more on armaments, particularly in the field of nuclear armament in an effort to catch up with us. Does this look like a good bet to you?

MR. NITZE: Well, I think they have already increased their defense budgets. They did during the course of the Berlin crisis of '60-'61-'62, and they then raised their defense budgets by an appreciable amount and I think a very substantial proportion of those increased defense budgets are going into an effort to build up their side of the nuclear balance.

MR. SCALI: These rumors though speak of a possible crash program by the Soviets in the nuclear arms field.

MR. NITZE: I have no indications that would support that.

MR. BATE: I would like to change the area of questioning for just a minute, if I may. Do you feel there is any truth to the claim as has been made by Senator Morse, among others, that the usefulness or effectiveness of NATO is dead, is over?

MR. NITZE: I think quite the contrary. I have just returned from the Ottawa meeting. Frankly it was my view that this was one of our most successful NATO meetings. The things that were to be done at Ottawa, these were done and were effectively done,

and beyond that the quality of the discussion in the NATO meeting was as high or higher than that in any meeting in which I have participated and I have participated in a number of the NATO meetings.

MR. BATE: I am told that at the NATO meeting the great emphasis was placed on the idea that our NATO allies must begin to pick up more of their share of the cost of NATO. Do you see any chance of this? Both in men and in financial cost.

MR. NITZE: Well, we do believe that the United States is bearing a disproportionate share of the burden in NATO, and we have for a long period of time thought that our NATO allies could properly take a larger portion of the common alliance requirements. And they have picked up a larger portion. The NATO ex-U.S. defense budgets have increased particularly since the Berlin crisis. The country that has increased its defense budget most impressively, of course, is West Germany. I think their defense budget is -- I think it has roughly doubled since the beginning of the Berlin crisis. I think it has gone up some 25 percent in the last year. Other countries have increased their defense budgets less.

Some have increased them even in relationship to the growth in their national product, in relationship to the general increase in their capacity. Others have not. Others

have increased their defense budgets, but not as much as the rise in their economic productivity.

MR. BATE: Aren't we walking all the way around a man named Charles de Gaulle, here?

MR. NITZE: Charles de Gaulle, General de Gaulle and France have a very high defense budget in relationship to the terms of the other NATO countries, ex the United States. It isn't that France isn't putting a great deal into its defense effort. What we are concerned about is that that defense effort support the alliance and the alliance interests, and not just French national interests.

MR. SCALI: Mr. Nitze, as you well recall one of the Ottawa newspapers during the middle of the conference had an eight-column headline at one point saying that the American proposal for the multination nuclear force was dead. By that I mean the proposal to arm a series of surface ships with Polaris missiles. Do you agree with that?

MR. NITZE: I don't agree with that, no.

The proposal for what we have called the multilateral force -- and this proposal was for a series of ships, as you have suggested, with Polaris missiles on these ships, and the ships and the missiles would be commonly owned by a number of NATO countries.

MR. BATE: And commonly manned.

MR. NITZE: And commonly manned and controlled by

NATO and by the people that would contribute to this force. Now this is a very ambitious scheme. No alliance that I can think of has ever had that kind of a force which was owned in common, manned in common, controlled in common. Now this we never thought could be done right off the bat. We thought if this was really of interest to the other members of the NATO alliance who have taken a strong position in the past, that nuclear armaments are so important to their defense as well as ours that they would like to participate in this share of their defenses.

We thought that this was perhaps the best way in which this could be done. Now work on this is continuing. I think to say that this is dead just because things go slowly or because somebody is against it and wants to inquire about this, that, or the other thing is the wrong way of putting it.

MR. BATE: It hasn't been enthusiastically received, though, by all the members of NATO, has it?

MR. NITZE: No, it has not.

MR. SCALI: And the West Germans if I recall, Mr. Nitze, are the only ones on record as saying they would definitely be prepared to join such a force?

MR. NITZE: That is correct. But others are studying the proposal carefully.

MR. SCALI: Do you think the British can afford to

join both this proposal and the other inter-allied nuclear force, Force No. 2?

MR. NITZE: I do.

MR. SCALI: And do you expect that perhaps the Italians, the Greeks and the Turks may go along?

MR. NITZE: I think they might.

MR. BATE: Would such a force have to be free of the American veto on when to push the button?

MR. NITZE: No, we do not think that it should be free of U. S. participation in the decision to use the force. After all this force would not be a large percentage of the aggregate alliance forces. The main alliance force is after all the Strategic Air Command of the United States. This supplies perhaps 90, 95, 97 percent of the aggregate deterrent power of the alliance and it would seem to us unwise to have an arrangement under which a force which is such a small percentage of the aggregate alliance force might be used not with the full cooperation of the major force.

MR. BATE: Does this mean though that for example these surface ships with nuclear-tipped Polaris missiles could be used in such a way -- let's say three or four people would have to vote before a Polaris could be launched from one of these ships -- suppose we voted no. Could the missile then be used?

MR. NITZE: No, it could not.

MR. SCALI: Well, Mr. Nitze, the German Defense Minister said that in order to have a force that is truly effective and in real partnership with the United States that eventually the American veto on when to fire these missiles must disappear.

MR. NITZE: I think what the German Defense Minister had in mind was really a different point. His point was that it would be desirable if the participation in this force were as wide as possible. That it include not only the U. S., Germany, Greece, Turkey, Italy, Belgium, but also the U. K. and also France.

Obviously if one could have a force of this kind which included all the principal members of the alliance, this would be preferable to having a force in which only some members of the alliance participated. And what he said was that he thought a force in which the United States did not have a veto would be the only one in which General de Gaulle might be interested. I think this is the implication at least of what the German Defense Minister said.

MR. SCALI: Well, Governor Rockefeller in effect has suggested the same thing and he has suggested that the United States help develop a separate European nuclear deterrent, one that would be in real partnership with us. Do you see any value in that?

MR. NITZE: I don't think that is a practicable idea. This is different again from what Mr. von Hassel, the German Defense Minister, was talking about. As I understand

Governor Rockefeller's proposal this would be a European force, not a NATO force. What we have been discussing before was a NATO force which we and perhaps Canada, but the alliance as a whole at least would have the right to join, should they so desire.

I think what Governor Rockefeller was talking about was a force which would be specifically a European force.

Now before one can really seriously contemplate that kind of a force -- and I think the French agree with this -- one would have to have a far higher degree of European organization and unity and virtually a Federation of Europe before such a force would make sense.

Now the French take the position that we overestimate the degree of European unity today. They say that any such conception would perhaps take ten years. Not in the event of a unified Europe, then that unified Europe would include within itself the present British capability, the French capability, and they have nuclear capabilities today, so it would have a nuclear force and we would then have to work out the arrangements and we think those arrangements would probably be the NATO arrangement between these two. But then something along the lines of what Governor Rockefeller was talking about would be possible. But in the current context, I for one do not believe it to be a realistic proposal.



MR. BATE: France, of course, is continuing to go ahead with its own "go it alone" nuclear force, to use the words. Could you tell us what kind of progress they are making and what kind of troubles they are running into?

MR. NITZE: Well, the first phase of their program would be the Mirage bomber force and I think the first one of those have already come off the line and I think by fall they will have a few and they may very well have the weapons to go with those few. I think before they build up to the full force which they contemplate, which is 48 or 50 bombers, I think this might be well into 1965 before they --

MR. BATE: Are they running into some troubles, do you think?

MR. NITZE: I don't believe they are running into troubles with the production of their bombers, but they propose that thereafter they might have either submarine-based missiles or some other type of delivery system, because of the great vulnerability of a bomber force, particularly that close to the USSR. And it is within that expanded program, looking further into the future, that I think they are probably running into the same problems that anyone in this business faces, and that is that it is a very complex, difficult business, and the costs tend to exceed one's original estimate.

MR. SCALI: Do you think in terms of developing the first generation of their weapons and delivery system that it is not any more expensive or complex than they had anticipated?

MR. NITZE: That I wouldn't be able to testify to. I just don't know the answer.

MR. SCALI: Mr. Nitze, what do you think of the whole concept of the initial French nuclear deterrent? That is sending a Mirage bomber with a free-fall gravity bomb on it to a Russian target flying at a very, very low altitude. Do you think this is a feasible way of hitting a target?

MR. NITZE: Well, I think this is what the French could do. It isn't that they wouldn't prefer to have submarine-based missiles. But what they have produced and are in the process of producing is a bomber.

MR. SCALI: But do you think they could reach a target say as far distant as the Soviet Union, with a nuclear weapon aboard and not be shot down by, for example, the Russian anti-aircraft missile?

MR. NITZE: Well, I wouldn't like to express an opinion on that.

MR. BATE: Do you see any signs that the Russians plan to heat up the Berlin crisis again at any time soon?

MR. NITZE: At the moment there are no indications that they so intend, but I think this goes back to the former

question we were discussing as to the outcome of the Soviet discussions with the Chinese Communists, what Soviet policy might be after those discussions are resolved one way or another and then it is conceivable that as part of a harder Soviet line that the Berlin issue would again become an immediate and important issue.

MR. BATE: To switch you out of Berlin for a moment, do you feel that there is any truth in reports that there is a Soviet submarine base or bases being built in Cuba and that such bases pose as big a threat to our security as the hard-based missile sites which were in Cuba and were removed?

MR. NITZE: Well, I don't think it is so. Certainly we have no evidence to support the view that the Soviets are building a submarine base. Now this does not mean that we can -- you can never make negative proof. You can't prove that it is impossible, but we certainly have no evidence that would lead us to believe that they are so doing, and we don't believe that they are, sir.

MR. SCALI: Mr. Nitze, many people say that we just haven't been tough enough with the Soviets in demanding that they pull their some 15,000 remaining troops out of Cuba. Why aren't we tougher on that?

MR. NITZE: Well, I take it this question presupposes that if one raises one's tone of voice, one somehow or other gets the Soviets to do something with otherwise they

wouldn't intend to do. That doesn't work. Just as if the Soviets raised their voice to us, that doesn't cause us to take an action. We did have a choice at the time of the original Cuban crisis in October, as to whether our minimum requirements for lifting the quarantine would include not only the removal of the offensive weapons systems but also the removal of all Soviet troops there. At that time it was decided that to get the solution that we wanted it was probably wisest to concentrate on the removal of the offensive weapons systems.

Now it was not that we didn't realize the importance, then, of trying to get the Soviet personnel out, because we don't believe there is any reason for them to be there, but we did not make that a condition. But since that time we have been trying to get them out as best we can with the means that are available.

MR. SCALI: Do you think eventually they will go -- in 15 seconds.

MR. NITZE: I hate to predict on this, but I think they will.

MR. SCALI: Well, Mr. Nitze, we want to thank you very much for being with us today on ISSUES AND ANSWERS.

THE ANNOUNCER: Next week at this same time ISSUES AND ANSWERS will bring you a conversation with the President of India, Dr. Sarnepalli Radhakrishnan, here on a state visit as a guest of President Kennedy. We hope you will be with us.

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